Amnesia and emotion : a case study by Chapelle, Gaëtane et al.
Published in: Brain and Cognition (1996), vol. 30, issue 3, pp. 338-340 
DOI: - 
Status : Postprint (Author’s version)  
   
Amnesia and Emotion: A Case Study 
GAÉTANE CHAPELLE, PIERRE PHILIPPOT, MARTIAL VAN DER LINDEN 
Laboratoire de neuropsychologie, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Québec, Canada 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates several aspects of emotion in a severely amnesic patient, AC, who is clinically 
described to have emotionally changed since his amnesia. Two cognitive dimensions of emotions 
were explored: (a) general knowledge of emotion and (b) induced emotional feeling states. The 
results show that AC’s general knowledge of emotions is normal. Furthermore, AC is able to describe 
changes in his expression of anger, despite his complete inability to remember a precise event of 
anger, before or after his amnesia. Under laboratory emotional induction, AC displays normal 
emotional profiles except in the “sadness” condition, where he reports clearly positive feeling 
states. After a 3-week delay, AC is able to retrieve substantial information, in cued recall and 
recognition condition, about an emotional episode. These results are discussed in the framework of 
recent interpretations of amnesia. 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate several aspects of emotion in a severely amnesic patient, 
AC (For a complete description of the case, see Van der Linden and Coyette, in press). Clinically, the 
patient is described as apathetic and emotionally flat, with a tendency to remain in a mildly positive 
state. He sometimes shows brief episodes of externalized anger when confronted with a difficulty. 
No episodes of fear or sadness could be recalled by his parents in the 7 years since AC’s accident. 
Two cognitive dimensions of emotions were particularly explored: (a) general knowledge of emotion 
and (b) induced emotional feeling states. 
1. Recognition of emotional facial expression. AC and 10 control subjects viewed photographs 
of faces expressing four different emotions (anger, sadness, disgust, and joy) at different intensities 
and four mixed emotions (adapted from Matsumoto (1993) by Hess and Blairy, unpublished). They 
were asked to rate the emotion expressed by each face on seven emotional scales. Results show that 
AC’s recognition of emotional facial expression is completely normal. 
2. General knowledge of emotions. 2.1. Schemata about bodily sensations: AC and 5 control 
subjects completed a questionnaire (Philippot, 1992) regarding the intensity with which a typical 
person would feel a series of bodily sensations during given emotions. AC showed bodily sensation 
schemata similar to control subjects. 
2.2. Prototypical components of emotions: AC and 7 control subjects were administered 25 
sentences describing everyday situations and were asked to attribute one of seven emotions to each 
situation. The results indicate that AC attributes the same emotion to each prototypical situation as 
control subjects. 
3. Self-assessment on emotional expression. AC and his parents were administered a self-
assessment questionnaire (Maes, van.Elderen, Van der Ploeg, and Spielberger, 1987) measuring 
anger expression style and control. AC’s parents, and AC himself, were asked to complete the 
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questionnaire about AC’s expression of anger before and after his amnesia. This questionnaire gives 
scores for externalization and internalization of anger and for control over each type of expression. 
AC’s parents report that AC’s expression and control of anger has changed since the onset of his 
amnesia. More specifically, it appears that AC internalized his anger before his amnesia, whereas 
since his accident he externalizes it. 
Furthermore, AC was able to describe this change in the expression of anger, despite his complete 
inability to remember any particular event involving anger, before or after his amnesia. 
4. AC’s subjective feeling states under laboratory emotional induction. AC, and 10 control subjects, 
were exposed to six emotional video-clips (Philippot, 1993) and a neutral one. Immediately after 
each video-clip, subjects reported emotional feeling states by filling the Differential Emotions Scale 
(Izard, Dougherty, Bloxom, & Kotsch, 1974). Before viewing the video-clips, subjects listened to 3 min 
of audio-taped relaxation instructions. After the first relaxation, a baseline of emotional profile for 
AC and the control subjects was taken. AC’s memory of the video-clip was tested after the subjective 
measure. 
A comparison between AC and the control subjects showed that AC reported a normal emotional 
profile in most emotional conditions. Nevertheless, in the “sadness” condition, AC reported no 
negative feeling states, but a clearly positive one. In fact, this profile is similar to the baseline. AC’s 
emotional profile in the “sadness” condition would appear, then, to be abnormal. 
We were interested in measuring AC’s recall of an emotional episode. After a 3-week delay, AC 
was totally unable to spontaneously recall any information about the episodes in the laboratory or 
about any video-clip he had seen. Nevertheless, in cued recall and recognition condition, AC could 
retrieve substantial information about some video-clips. This is consistent with Hirst’s diary study 
results (1994), showing that amnesics can recall little if anything about past episodes, but are much 
more efficient in cued recall or recognition. 
These results are discussed in the framework of recent interpretations of amnesia. 
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